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The Jaws That Bite, the Claws That Snatch*

I. INTRODUCTION

In State v. Michels,' the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal
affirmed the defendant's conviction on a charge of aggravated oral
sexual battery when the only "weapon" involved was Michels' pit bull
terrier. In affirming the conviction, the court failed to address a
longstanding line of Louisiana criminal cases holding that an inanimate
object is needed to meet the dangerous weapon requirement within the
meaning of Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:2(3).2 Although the court
reached the right result in affirming the conviction, the lack ofguidance
regarding dogs as dangerous weapons in Louisiana provides no real
value for future courts considering the problem.
The scope of this note is limited to an examination ofthe facts and
reasoning of the court in State v. Michels, the definition of dangerous
weapon, and certain issues ofstatutory construction.3 It will also provide
a survey ofthe national jurisprudence on the issue ofdangerous weapons
and dogs and aproposed solution to the oversight ofthe court inMichels.
II. FACTS

The victim was walking around the trailer park where she lived in
Kenner on the evening of July 9, 1997, when she saw the defendant,
whom she knew was also a resident of the trailer park. She accepted an
offer from the defendant to join him for a beer in his trailer. After a few
minutes inside the trailer, while both were drinking their beers, the
defendant removed his pants and forced the victim's pants down.
Michels then forced her to perform oral sex on him and raped her.
At trial the victim stated that she fought Michels off by kicking and
hitting him, but that he ignored her attacks and statements that she did
not want to have sex with him. The victim also testified at trial that the
defendant's pit bull was in the trailer during the incident and that it bared
its teeth and growled at the victim while she was struggling with the
defendant. She said she believed the defendant could control the dog's
behavior and that he would command the dog to attack her if she
continued to struggle.
Based on the victim's testimony, the trial court found that the
defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon at the time of the
Copyright 2001, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
*

Title taken from "Jabberwocky," by Lewis Carol.

1. 726 So. 2d 449 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1999).

2. See generally State v. Calvin, 209 La. 257, 24 So. 2d 467 (1945).
3. The second issue addressed by the appellate court in State v. Michels, the
defendant's claim of insufficiency of the bill of information, is beyond the scope
of this article.
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encounter, and thus, defendant's conduct satisfied the elements of
aggravated oral sexual battery within Louisiana Revised Statutes
14:43.4(3). 4 The appellate court, in discussing the claimed insufficiency
ofthe bill ofinformation filed against the defendant, makes clear"[flrom
our review ofthe proceedings in the record prior to trial, it was obvious
that only the first three subsections ofR.S. 14:43.4 could possibly applY
in this case. All three deal specifically with force or threats of force."
The defendant was convicted by jury trial of aggravated oral sexual
battery. A motion in arrest ofjudgment or new trial was denied by the
trial court, and the defendant was sentenced to five years at hard labor,
suspended, with three years active probation.6 The appellate court
affirmed the conviction and held that sufficient evidence was provided
for the jury to find the defendant armed with a dangerous weapon.7
III. DISCUSSION

A. Statutes and Caseson Weapon Definition
1. Statutory Definition
Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:2 provides the definitions used
throughout the criminal code. Subsection (3) states, "'Dangerous
4. La. R.S. 14:43.4(A) (Supp. 2001), aggravated oral sexual battery,
subsections 1-6 provide that an oral sexual battery is aggravated:
(1) When the victim resists the act to the utmost, but whose resistance is
overcome by force.
(2) When the victim is prevented from resisting the act by threats of great
and immediate bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power ofexecution.
(3) When the victim is prevented from resisting the act because the
offender is armed with a dangerous weapon.
(4) When the victim is under the age oftwelve years. Lack ofknowledge
of the victim's age shall not be a defense.
(5) When two or more offenders participated in the act without the
consent of the victim.
(6) When the victim is prevented from resisting the act because the victim
suffers from a physical or mental infirmity preventing such resistance.
5. Michels, 726 So. 2d at 452.
6. Defendant appealed to the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal which
was granted on April 2, 1998. Two issues were presented on appeal: the claimed
insufficiency ofthe bill of information and the claimed failure of the State to carry
its burden of proof as to each element of the crime of aggravated oral sexual
battery. On remand, the trial court was ordered to correct its verdict to show that
the defendant had in fact been convicted ofthe lesser included charge ofattempted
aggravated oral sexual battery; a distinction that has no meaning for purposes of
this article. Michels, 726 So. 2d at 453.
7. Michels, 726 So. 2d at 453.
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Weapon' includes any gas, liquid, or other substance or
instrumentality, which, in the manner used, is calculated or likely to
produce death or great bodily harm."'
The rule of interpretation for criminal statutes is expressed in
Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:3, which states:
The articles ofthis Code cannot be extended by analogy so as
to create crimes not provided for herein; however, in order to
promote justice and to effect the objects ofthe law, all of its
provisions shall be given a genuine construction, according
to the fair import oftheir words, taken in their usual sense, in
connection with the context, and with reference to the
purpose of the provision.
In light of these two articles, two questions arise: how do they relate
to each other, and how have they been treated in the jurisprudence.
Professor Dale Bennet, who served as Louisiana State Law
Institute Reporter for the 1942 revision of the Louisiana Criminal
Code, explained that the code was to be read as a civilian document,
not a mere compilation of common law rules.9 The articles of the
code were based on the civilian model, with careful generalization,
so as to avoid lengthy and specific enumerations as well as the claims
of defendants that "my crime doesn't exactly match your statute."'
Further, the genuine construction indicated by Louisiana Revised
Statutes 14:3 indicates that the articles should be given a natural and
logical interpretation, rather than a mechanistic or overly limiting
interpretation. " For Professor Bennet, the two articles together were
a codification ofthe Louisianajurisprudence, which allowed avariety
of items to be designated as dangerous weapons, depending on
"whether it is dangerous 'in the manner used."'
2. Louisiana CaseLaw on Weapons
One of the first cases to deal with the dangerous weapon issue
was State v. Calvin, 3 in which the Supreme Court of Louisiana
reversed a conviction of aggravated battery when the defendant had
kicked and bitten her victim. The holding in this regard is quite
narrow, and in summary states: teeth and fists are not dangerous
weapons within the meaning of Louisiana Revised Statutesl4:2(3).
8.

La. R.S. 14:2(3) (1997).

9. Dale E. Bennet, The Louisiana Criminal Code: Comparison of the
CriminalCode with PriorCriminalLaw, 5La L. Rev. 6, 6 (1942).
10. Id. at 7.
11. Id.at9.
12. Id.at 28 (citing State v. Washington, 104 La. 443, 445, 29 So. 55, 56
(1900)).
13. 209 La. 259, 24 So. 2d 467 (1945).
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The more influential portion of the case is the dicta, wherein Justice
Kennon responded to a claim by the district judge that "the Supreme
Court ofthe State ofLouisiana held that a person's bare fist could be
classed and used as a dangerous weapon, and that a person's teeth
could be classed as a dangerous weapon." 4 He stated that "[t]he fact
remains that there must be some proof of the use of some inanimate
instrumentality before a defendant can be held guilty ofassault 'with
a dangerous weapon. '
The case was criticized in academia for its dicta. A casenote on
State v. Calvin explained that instrumentality, as defined in Webster's
Dictionary, was merely a force or means used to achieve an end, and
had nothing to do with the animate or inanimate status of the means
employed." The same article proposed a more flexible test for
defining dangerous weapon, stating, "[t]he potential danger of the
method used should be the test of a 'dangerous weapon,' whether it
be a knife, the teeth, the fist, a gun, a stick, a dog, or any other
animate or inanimate instrumentality.' 7 Professor Bennett approved
of the result in Calvin, but saw the dicta as a potential problem and
hoped that it would be restricted to the facts of the case. He noted
that it would be absurd ifan offender who "set a pack ofvicious dogs
upon another would not be using a dangerous weapon because the
dogs could not be classed as 'inanimate""'18 and would therefore be
guilty only of simple battery.
Despite the academic criticism, subsequent Louisiana cases have
cited Calvin favorably.' 9 Thus, the case for its dicta, if not the
holding, may be considered enshrined in the Louisianajurisprudence.
It ought not to be disturbed lightly.
3. National CaseLaw on Weapons
Nationally, Calvin has been cited on both sides of the dangerous
20
weapon issue. The Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v. Davis
cited Calvin for support in holding:
[T]he notion that parts of the body may be used as dangerous
weapons has not been generally accepted elsewhere. The clear
14. Id. at 265, 24 So. 2d at 469 (italics omitted).
15. Id. at 266, 24 So. 2d at 469.
16. Ruby Stout, Note, AggravatedBattery-TheFist or Teeth as a Dangerous
Weapon: State v. Calvin, 7 La. L. Rev 584, 585 (1947).
17. Id. at 586.
18. See Dale E. Bennett, The Work of the Supreme Court,7 La. L. Rev. 288,
289 (1947).
19. See State v. Bonier, 367 So. 2d 824, 826 (La. 1979); State v. Clark, 527 So.
2d 542, 543 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988); State v. Gould, 395 So. 2d 647, 655 (La.
1981).

20. 406 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980).
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weight ofauthority is to the effect that bodily parts alone cannot
constitute a dangerous weapon forthe purpose ofan aggravated
assault based on the alleged use of such a weapon. This is so,
irrespective ofthe degree of harm inflicted. 2'
In contrast, the Minnesota Supreme Court held in Statev. Born that
"[f]ists, when used to strike, and feet, when used to stomp another
person, may or may not be dangerous weapons depending on the
circumstances ofthe case. 22 Regardless, the bulk ofauthority favors
the Louisiana position on unarmed assailants, as shown by the
Nebraska case of State v. Bachelor which held the "opinions in
VanDiver,Owusu, Davis, and Calvin, to be sound, as is the dissent in
' in finding that hands and
Sturgis. They represent the majority view"23
feet are not dangerous weapons.
Public policy, as awhole, supports the notion that fists and teeth are
not ordinarily dangerous weapons. Making any person's hands, feet, or
teeth dangerous weapons gives the state an endless capacity to upgrade
offenses. Matters ofproof become extraordinarily difficult, when a
person claims that not only was a defendant behaving in a threatening
or menacing manner so as to constitute assault, but that the defendant
used his bare hands in a manner that suggested they were dangerous
weapons thus making the appropriate charge aggravated assault.
Perhaps a boxer or martial arts expert should be so categorized, but the
results ofsuch an attack have already been considered by the legislature,
and the statutes reflect this consideration, as discussed below.
B. DisparityofSentencing andDevelopment ofIntermediate
Offenses
Simple battery is a battery committed without a weapon, and
carries a maximum sentence of six months in jail or a fine of up to
21. Id. at 420.
22. 159 N.W.2d 283,284 (Minn. 1968) (citing Calvih as authority ofa split in
the national jurisprudence, one which the court ultimately decided differently than

Louisiana).
23. 575 N.W.2d 625, 631 (Neb. Ct. App. 1998).

24. See People v. Van Diver, 263 N.W.2d 370, 373 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977):

If we were to rule that bare hands could be a dangerous weapon, it would
lead to anomalous results, for practically every assault that would qualify
as an aggravated assault, M.C.L.A. §750.81 a; M.C.A. § 28.276(1), would
also be capable of prosecution as an assault with a dangerous weapon,
M.C.L.A. § 750.82; M.S.A. § 28.277. It is our belief that the Legislature
did not contemplate this result but instead intended that the statutes should
be distinct and separate. To fulfill the Legislature's intent, it is our
opinion that the term "dangerous weapon" cannot be construed to include
the bare hand.
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$500, or both.25 Aggravated battery is committed with a dangerous
weapon, as defined in Louisiana Revised Statutesl4:2(3), and is
punishable by a fine up to $10,000 or prison with or without hard
labor for up to ten years, or both.26 Sentencing disparity between the
two charges was a real problem, insofar as there was no intermediate
charge between simple battery and aggravated battery.
The legislative response to the perceived problem was the 1978
revision ofthe battery statutes, introducing an intermediate charge of
second degree battery to resolve this problem.2 7 The second degree
battery statute is designed to cover situations where serious damage
is inflicted without use ofa weapon, such that the law would not have
to be subverted to reach aggravated
battery in order to appropriately
28
sentence a "merciless assailant.,
One of the first cases to utilize the intermediate charge was State
v. Fuller,9 in which a professional bar bouncer got into a fight with
a nineteen year old over a pool game inflicting permanent visual
damage with a single blow. The court rejected the defendant's claims
that he lacked the intent required for second degree battery as well as
his claim that second degree battery was designed for a situation
where an assailant continually batters a downed opponent.
Certain post-revision cases using the battery statutes are
problematic, such as State v. Taylor3° and State v. Munoz,3 where the
defendants were charged with aggravated assault for kicking their
victims while wearing rubber soled tennis shoes. While the sentence
in Taylor would nearly have been within the range for second degree
battery (three years at hard labor and a fine of $5,000.00),32 the

sentence in Munoz often years at hard labor was not." On the other
hand, because the aggravated battery charge in Munoz was a
responsive verdict to the original charge of attempted murder (the
victim was in a coma), the prosecution's case becomes more
reasonable. Although questionable on theory, such that an everyday
25. La. R.S. 14:35 (1997).
26. La. R.S. 14:34 (1997).

27. La. R.S. 14:34.1 (1997) (second degree battery punishable by a fine ofnot
more than $2,000, or prison with or without hard labor for up to five years, or both).

28. The court in Calvin acknowledged the possibility that "... portions of the

human anatomy may be dangerous and the bare hands of a merciless assailant may
quite readily 'produce death or great bodily harm,' particularly if the victim be
young or weak. . ." but still felt policy was better served by their definition of

dangerous weapon as inanimate object. State v. Calvin, 209 La. 257, 265, 24 So.
2d 467, 469 (1945).
29. 414 So. 2d 306 (La. 1982).

30. 485 So. 2d 117, 118-120 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986).
31. 575 So. 2d 848 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writdenied, 577 So. 2d 1009 (1991).
32. Taylor, 485 So. 2d at 118.
33. Munoz, 575 So. 2d at 851 (finding assignment of maximum sentence by
trial judge not to be excessive).
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garment may be considered a dangerous weapon,34 Munoz at least
can be explained on the equities of the case. State v. Rainey35 is
much clearer on the proposition of "garment as weapon." There, the
defendant was convicted ofaggravated battery for kicking his victim
with steel-toed boots so as to inflict brain damage and other
permanent ijuries.
The approach taken in the battery statutes of creating an
intermediate charge, however, does not seem applicable to the oral
sexual battery series. Currently, oral sexual battery carries a penalty
of imprisonment with or without hard labor for up to fifteen years."
Aggravated oral sexual battery carries a penalty of imprisonment
with or without hard labor for a maximum oftwenty years." Given
the narrow spread ofmaximum sentencing, there does not seem to be
much room for variation as existed with battery.
The test used 38 for the intermediate charge in the battery series
also does not seem appropriate for the oral sexual battery series,
because it is the threat level-not necessarily the end damage result
that is the primary issue for the potentially upgraded charge. Actual
damage to the victim merely provides an additional charge useable
against the defendant. However, the ability to properly upgrade the
offense without violating the statutory construction rules would seem
to have independent value, if only in maintaining judicial integrity
and public trust of the system.
C. Dog cases
1. LouisianaJurisprudence
As the case law now stands, the only two criminal cases in
Louisiana in which the issue of a dog as weapon has arisen are State
34. On the contrary, garments and nearly any other inanimate object can be
used and classified as a dangerous weapon in Louisiana. See State v. Clark, 527 So.
2d 542 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988) (metal sign post); State v. Leggett, 363 So. 2d 434
(La. 1978) (unloaded, non-functional gun); State v. Reed, 712 So. 2d 572 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1998) (bed sheet, sofa cushions).
35. 722 So. 2d 1097 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1998).

36. La. R.S. 14:43.3 (1997).
37. La. R.S. 14:43.4 (Supp. 2001).
38. Louisiana Revised Statute 14:34.1 provides in part:
Second degree battery is a battery ...when the offender intentionally

inflicts serious bodily injury. For purposes of this article, serious bodily

injury means bodily injury which involves unconsciousness, extreme
physical pain or protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss

or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental
faculty, or a substantial risk of death.
La. R.S. 14:34.1 (1997).
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v. Michels and State In Re L.D.L., Jr. StateIn Re L.D.L., Jr.dealt
with a juvenile, adjudicated delinquent, in pertinent part due to a
charge of aggravated battery. The state alleged that "[t]he pit bull
dog was the 'force or intimidation' but not a dangerous weapon. "40
The state's allegation in the petition should lead an observer at this
point to suspect that the prosecution was aware of the required
inanimate nature ofdangerous weapons and was trying to finesse the
point. In the court's order, which was primarily concerned with
procedural matters, the court noted the possibility that a dog could be
a dangerous weapon for the purposes of aggravated battery. Further,
the juvenile was charged with simple robbery, and the court's orders
directed defendant's counsel to brief a variety of issues, including:
whether a dog can be a dangerous weapon and, if so, whether the
juvenile's dog was proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, to be a
dangerous weapon for purposes of aggravated battery.4 ' Although
both cases have been resolved,42 these are not mere novelties. While
rare thus far in Louisiana, the following review of the national
jurisprudence will show that these cases are reasonably common.
2. NationalJurisprudence
In the national jurisprudence, criminal dog cases are not common
in any one state, but taken as a whole they represent a noticeable
subset of criminal actions.4 3 Almost exactly on point is State v.
Sinks," where a Doberman Pinscher and a knife were used to provide
the force in a sexual assault. Stipulating the dangerousness of the
knife, the court went on to discuss the dog as weapon writing:
Sinks argues that a dog cannot be an instrumentality because
instrumentality refers only to an inanimate object. However,
the common and ordinary definition of instrumentality
contains no such limitation. Instrumentality is defined as
"something by which an end is achieved." Webster's Third
New Int'lDictionary 1172 (Unabr. 1976). Additionally, the
statute does not limit or confine the definition of "dangerous
weapon" to only inanimate objects. Therefore, based on the
39. 714 So. 2d 780 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1998).
40. Id. at 782.
41. Id.at 783.
42. Michels has exhausted appellate review and In ReL.D.L., Jr.has no further
reported actions.
43. The most common sort ofcomplaint regarding a dog attack is a civil rights
claim brought under 28 U.S.C.S. 1983 (2001) against the police. Since these cases
deal with the proportionality of the force used by the state and bypass the issue of
definition, they are outside of the scope of this article, and I will focus on private
disputes where dogs have been used or claimed to have been used as weapons.
44. 483 N.W.2d 286 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
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plain language of the statute, we conclude that the definition
of "dangerous weapon" in sec. 939.22(10), 41 Stats., as
applicable to sec. 940.225(1)(b), Stats., is sufficiently broad
to include animate, as well as inanimate, objects.46
Of course, the Wisconsin court did not have to contend with Calvin
and its progeny, which are in direct conflict with the holding in Sinks.
Cases from Massachusetts, 47 California, 48 Wisconsin,49 Florida,50 and
other states,5 ' have held that a dog can be a dangerous weapon under
the proper circumstances. As noted above, the holding in Calvin52
appears to be supported by public policy. All that remains to be
examined is how to bring Louisiana's dangerous weapon statute into
accord with the national jurisprudence without losing the holding of
Calvin, and then apply it to the facts ofMichels.
IV. SOLUTIONS

Creation of intermediate offenses for oral sexual battery or other
offenses such as assault, robbery, sexual battery, as discussed above,
does not seem like a viable solution due to the narrow spread of
punishment available for some ofthese crimes. Because intermediate
offenses already exist for battery and aggravated battery, 53 the need
is not as pressing for those offenses. There still exists, however, a
45. Wis. Stat. § 939.22(10) (Supp. 2000) reads:
"Dangerous weapon" means any firearm, whether loaded or unloaded; any
device designed as a weapon and capable of producing death or great
bodily harm; any electric weapon, as defined in s. 941.295 (4); or any
other device or instrumentality which, in the manner it is used or intended
to be used, is calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm.
46. Sinks, 483 N.W.2d at 289.
47. Commonwealth v. Tarrant, 326 N.E.2d 710 (Mass. 1975) held:
[W]e conclude that the Commonwealth, in order to prove the crime of
armed robbery in this case, was not required to have affirmatively
demonstrated that the dog was actually dangerous (Commonwealth v.
Henson, supra,) or was in fact used in a harm-inflicting manner, since the
proper inquiry is whether the instrumentality is such as to present an
objective threat of danger to a person of reasonable and average
sensibility.
48. People v. Nealis, 283 Cal. Rptr. 376 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1991).
49. State v. Bodoh, 582 N.W.2d 440 (Wis. Ct. App.), review granted, 588
N.W.2d 631 (1998), aff'd, 595 N.W.2d 330 (Wis. 1999).
50. Clark v. State, 632 So. 2d 88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1994), overruled
in part by T.B. v. State, 669 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1996).
51. SeegenerallyVitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, DogasDeadlyorDangerous
Weapon for Purposes of Statutes Aggravating Offenses Such as Assault and
Robbery, 7 A.L.R. 4th 607 (1981) and the authority cited therein.
52. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
53. Second Degree Battery, La. R.S. 14:34.1 (1997); Aggravated Second
Degree Battery, La. RS. 14:34.7 (Supp. 2001).
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potential gap assuming that a particularly brutal attack by a person
using a dog might be better charged as aggravated battery or
aggravated second degree battery rather than second degree battery.
The scheme of upgraded offenses seems to reflect a policy of
deterrence of weapon use in the commission of crimes, in order to
54
reduce the threat level and danger, to both victims and perpetrators.
The general theory is that an unarmed assailant is not only less likely
to seriously injure his victim, but also less likely to provoke a lethal
response in self-defense or by law enforcement, thus minimizing the
violence involved with the crime. Controlling the use of animals
used to assist in the commission of a crime of violence would also
serve this policy. The implementation would have to be cautious in
order to avoid situations in which simple negligence, such as failure
to maintain control of an animal, might lead to serious criminal
charges being filed.
A simple solution would be to replace Louisiana Revised Statutes
14:2(3) with a ready-made definition that appears to cover all
possibilities, such as the Model Penal Code definition. Under the
Model Penal Code, a dangerous weapon is defined as "any firearm,
or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance, whether
animate or inanimate, which in the manner in which it is used or is
intended to be used is known to be capable of producing death or
serious bodily injury."55 There are two problems that immediately
spring to mind with this solution, the first being that it would appear
to overrule the holding of Calvin, which would be a loss. If bare
hands and bare feet (ignoring the shoe issue) could be considered
dangerous weapons, there is no encounter between unarmed
antagonists that does not potentially escalate into either aggravated
battery or aggravated second degree battery, or that does not, by
parties arguing, constitute aggravated assault. A policy of defining
hands and feet as weapons under potentially any circumstance is the
kind of free upgrade to offenses that should be avoided at all costs.
It leads to long sentences for minor crimes and possibly runs afoul of
constitutional issues, such as overbreadth and notice. The second,
more selfish reason to avoid introduction of a whole definition from
54. AccordCommonwealth v. Tarrant, 326 N.E.2d 710, 713-14 (Mass. 1975)
(affirming the conviction of a defendant for armed robbery where the primary

"4weapon" was a German Shepard). The purpose ofthe statute is to make robbery
while possessing a dangerous weapon a more serious offense because such robbery
"would naturally lead to resistance and conflict" in which use of the dangerous
weapon may be expected to follow. Thus, it is not only the actual use of the
weapon in the harm inflicted that makes the crime of armed robbery aggravated.
Rather, it is more importantly the potential for injury and the tendency toward

resistance, conflict, and violence which exists when robbery is perpetrated with the
use of a dangerous weapon.
55. Model Penal Code § 210.0 (1962).
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the Model Penal Code is that the Louisiana Criminal Code is a quasicivilian code,56 such that it would be better to develop a local remedy
than import a foreign one, especially a common law or federal article.
If, in fact, a local solution is better than a foreign one, then the courts
could simply construe Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:2(3) as intended
by Dr. Bennett 7 and allow a dog to be seen as an instrumentality
which may be used in a manner calculated or likely to produce death
or great bodily harm. Other courts have considered the problem, with
highly similar statutory language, and come up with differing results.
State v. Bodoh58 serves as an example of what Louisiana should
avoid. The Wisconsin courts found the defendant criminally liable
for a dog attack where the defendant was not present and the dogs
were not trained to attack. This sort of liability fails the Louisiana
statutory requirement of "in the manner used, ' 9because the owner
did not direct the dogs to attack either actively or in any implied
fashion. The court found that the defendant's reference to his
animals as "guard dogs" in a letter written to police on issues
unrelated to the case showed the defendant's intent that the dogs be
"dangerous weapons." The court then applied criminal sanctions for
his negligent "handling" of the dogs (which had been deemed
dangerous weapons), finding that "physical or temporal proximity is
not a prerequisite to the statutory requirement that the defendant's
criminally negligent handling of a dangerous weapon cause the
necessary injury. 60 In Louisiana, applying the definition of
dangerous weapon, this result could not be reached, because there
would be no evidence that the instrumentality (dog) had been used in
any manner and certainly not in a manner calculated or likely to
produce death or great bodily harm.
People v. Nealis,6" a California decision, illustrates a more
rational result resolved under a statutory scheme similar to Louisiana.
The defendant ordered her Doberman Pinscher to attack the victim,
and the dog complied. The court explained California's definition of
a dangerous weapon as "any object, instrument, or weapon which is
used in such a manner as to be capable of producing and likely to
produce, death or great bodily injury. '62 The court reviewed a wide
variety of cases, focusing on the cases where the animal was
commanded to attack or where the defendant ordered the dog to take
56. Bennet, supra note 9, at 6.

57. Dale E.Bennett, CriminalLaw andProcedure,The Work ofthe Louisiana
Supreme Courtfor the 1945-1946 Term, 7La. L.Rev. 288, 289 (1947).
58. State v. Bodoh, 582 N.W.2d440 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992), reviewgranted,588
N.W.2d 631 (Wis. 1998), aff'd, 595 N.W.2d 330 (Wis. 1999).

59. La. R.S. 14:14:2(3) (1997).

60. Bodoh, 582 N.W.2d at 443.
61.

283 Cal. Rptr. 376 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1991).

62. Id. at 378.
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some action (guard, come, lay down, etc.) which gave the victim an
objective and reasonable fear that the dog was under the control of
the defendant. The court then held:
Depending upon the circumstances ofeach case, a dog trained
to attack humans on command, or one without training that
follows such a command, and which is of sufficient size and
strength relative to its victim to inflict death or great bodily
injury, may be considered a 'deadly weapon or instrument'.
63

This holding does not cover all of the possibilities, but does provide
a useful guideline, by giving the court flexibility to analyze each case
individually and still requiring objective elements about the animal.
There is a certain logical temptation, which apparently
overwhelmed the Michels court, to simply rely on the testimony of
the victim as to whether the dog was sufficiently menacing to
constitute a dangerous weapon. Other than the obvious problem of
again allowing free upgrades to prosecutors, such an analysis would
also contradict another important line ofLouisiana cases holding that
the victim's subjective fear of an object, by itself, is not enough to
make that object a dangerous weapon.
Applying this new interpretation ofdangerous weapon to the facts
in Michels, the victim was afraid (which should be a factor, though
not an extraordinary factor), and the animal was of a type that is
objectively frightening (pit bull terriers are well known as fighting
and guard dogs). However, the victim's testimony did not indicate
any action by the defendant that the dog was being used in the crime.
The defendant made no verbal threat that the dog would attack, nor
was there any command by the defendant to the animal that would
indicate any particular control. The victim's testimony only says that
the dog was in the trailer, bared its teeth, and growled-not that the
dog was used, in any manner, let alone in a manner "likely or
calculated to inflict death or serious bodily injury, ' 65 or even to create
a reasonable and objective fear of such. Under these circumstances,
where there is no obvious intent by the defendant to use the dog in
63. Id. at 379.
64. State v. Bonier, 367 So. 2d 824 (La. 1979) (stating that the dangerous
weapon analysis is a factual one, in which subjective fear of victim is significant
but not the determinative factor); State v. Byrd 385 So. 2d 248 (La. 1980) (setting
aside armed robbery conviction where defendant was armed with toy pistol and
clearly not a plausible threat); State Ex Rel Richey v. Butler, 572 So. 2d 1043 (La.
1991) (setting aside armed robbery conviction where defendant was armed with
crude simulation of bomb, constructed of 2x4, electrician's tape, and lady's

wristwatch, where victim never felt threatened and objective circumstances showed
threat not plausible).
65. La. R.S. 14:2(3) (1997).
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the commission of a crime, or more generally, to use or threaten to
use of the dog as a dangerous weapon, the court ought to have
affirmed the conviction on subsection 1, the victim resists but is
overcome, and subsection 2, threat offorce with ability to execute, of
the statute, but not subsection 3, while armed with a dangerous
weapon. 66
V. CONCLUSION

The construction of "dangerous weapon" under Louisiana
Revised Statutes 14:2(3) should be understood to include animals that
are actively used to commit crimes. As the problem has arisen
through the judiciary and the manner in Which it has construed
precedent, it would be a cleaner solution to allow the judiciary to
resolve the problem, rather than bring in the legislature. A new
understanding would bring Louisiana's position in line with the
national jurisprudence, and reflect the intent of the drafters of the
code. In total, the State should recognize the possibility that an
animate thing could be used as a dangerous weapon, but retain the
position that hands and feet are not.
Joseph K. Scott"

66. See supra note 4, for full text of subsections
** The author wishes to thank Professor Lee Hargrave for advising him on this
article. Everything depends on Mary Jo. Thanks to Mark Smylie, who put me as
an inspiration in his first published work.

